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THE STRANGER-TO-THE-MARRIAGE DOCTRINE:
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION ISSUES POST-
OBERGEFELL
LEE-FORD TRITT*
The recent Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges changed
the legal understanding of marriage in the United States. By making same-
sex marriage legal in all fifty states and requiring all states to recognize
same-sex marriages from other states, the Court in Obergefell recognized
evolving social attitudes toward same-sex marriage and expanded the legal
definition of "marriage" to include spouses of the same sex. In so doing,
the Court necessarily altered the implication of terms like "spouse,"
"husband," and "wife"-post-Obergefell, courts will need to construe these
words in a way that acknowledges an evolving understanding of marriage.
Courts have faced similar construction issues before. When the notion of
the American family shifted in the mid-nineteenth century to include
adopted children as "natural" children, courts struggled to ascertain
donative intent behind language like "child," "children," and "descendants"
that had traditionally excluded adoptees. The legalization and growing
popularity of adoption made presumptive exclusion of adoptees for
inheritance purposes socially obsolete, but neither society nor the law can
move directly from presumptive exclusion to presumptive inclusion. In the
adoption context, courts used several construction approaches to ascertain
and effectuate donative intent in a period of definitional transition when
words with once-plain meaning were inherently ambiguous. The
construction approaches used by courts to navigate social and legal change
in the context of adoption provide insight by analogy into the circumstances
that courts face today, as they must construe language that no longer
presumptively excludes same-sex spouses.
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INTRODUCTION
Obergefell v. Hodges' has forever altered American jurisprudence.
Not only did this decision make same-sex marriage legal in all fifty
states,2 it required all states to recognize same-sex marriages from other
states in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment.3 In so doing, the
Court in Obergefell took a critical construct and redefined it-post-
Obergefell, "marriage" includes marriage between spouses of the same
sex. Prior to the 2015 decision, the social definition of marriage
expanded to include same-sex spouses and some states legally
recognized same-sex marriages: society's understanding of the martial
relationship changed.' Obergefell reflects legal recognition of that
change in its official redefinition of "marriage" and, by implication, of
the attendant terms that denote a martial relationship; words like
"spouse," "husband," and "wife" now carry meaning that can indicate
marital status between members of the same sex.' Obergefell also
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Obergefell was a consolidation of six cases from
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee that involved fourteen same-sex couples and
two widowers from same-sex marriages who were either denied marriage licenses or
recognition of their out-of-state marriages. Id. at 2593.
2. Id. at 2604-05 (holding state laws "exclud[ing] same-sex couples from
civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples" to be
unconstitutional).
3. Id. at 2607-08 ("[T]here is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its
same-sex character.").
4. For a detailed account of the historical evolution of legal status of same-
sex marriage in the United States, see Lee-ford Tritt & Patrick J. Duffey, Windsor's
Wake: Non-Traditional Estate Planning Issues for Non-Traditional Families, 48 U.
MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1¶ 1100, 1101-02 (2014).
5. Despite having the opportunity to adjust critical language from "wife" and
"husband" to the gender neutral "spouse," the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
declined to do so. See Lee-ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The
Retroactive Application of Obergefell, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 873, 913-14.
The Treasury Department recently issued final regulations that reflect the
holdings of Windsor, Obergefell, and Revenue Ruling 2013-17. The
regulations define terms in the Code describing the marital status of
taxpayers for federal tax purposes. As in the earlier proposed regulations
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illustrates the co-evolutionary nature of American society and American
jurisprudence: where social definitions of concepts change, legal
definitions of the words that denote those concepts must also evolve.
Post-Obergefell, courts will need to construe terms like "spouse,"
"husband," and "wife" in way that acknowledges an evolving
understanding of marriage. Therefore, this Article will address real-
world construction issues in the estate planning context, where
recognition of marital status is particularly important in determining
distributions for testacy and intestacy purposes.6
Evolution is never instantaneous. Thus, courts struggle to resolve
the ambiguity that exists in the period when the same word may be
intended to convey either its traditional social and legal meaning or its
evolved social and legal meaning. Definitive clarity-symmetry
between a word's connotation and its denotation-is particularly
important in estates law, where courts regularly rely on a donor's
words to determine what meaning should be attributed to a donative
document.' Problems arise when courts, faced with changes in social
understanding and in law, must construe a donor's intent during a
period of conceptual and legal transition-when critical terms may be
inherently ambiguous because their legal and social definitions are not
yet aligned.
It has been said that a concrete example is a helpful tool to grasp
the abstract intricacies of this subject in a meaningful way.' Toward
that end, imagine a will executed pre-Obergefell, in a state where same-
sex marriage was illegal at the time of execution. The will creates a
trust for the benefit of the testator's "daughter, Lavergne and her
husband." Shirley is Lavergue's legal spouse now, but at the time the
testator drafted the will, the state-and perhaps the testator-did not
recognize the marriage. Moreover, the will could have been executed
before the concept of same-sex marriage had even become part of the
American social construct.' Should the court assume that the testator
(NPRM REG-148998-13), the final regulations provide that the terms
"spouse," "husband," and "wife" mean an individual lawfully married to
another individual, and the term "husband and wife" means two individuals
lawfully married to each other.
Id. at n.259 (citing T.D. 9785, 2016-38 C.B. 38, at 361).
6. This Article is based on actual cases percolating in the court system on
which the author has been asked to advise.
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 11.3, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
8. See Tritt, supra note 5, at 876 n.7 (citing Tritt & Duffey, supra note 4, ¶
1101.2).
9. The modem history of same-sex marriage in the United States is a
relatively brief narrative that began less than thirty years ago when the Hawaii Supreme
Court decided Baehr v. Lewin. See 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
375
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
did not intend to include a same-sex spouse and apply the "traditional"
definition of "husband" that was legally effective at the time the will
was executed?o Depending on how long ago the will executed, same-
sex marriage may not have been part of the social consciousness at all.
Would attempting to discern the testator's intent regarding same-sex
marriage then be a fruitless venture? Should the court simply interpret
the provision on its face-as granting to Lavergne's now-legal spouse,
Shirley? This Article suggests that in answering such a question, absent
explicit contrary ex ante instructions from the testator, a court that does
not account for definitional evolution runs the risk of applying an
exclusionary principle that tends to defeat donors' intent. Simply,
assuming that the testator meant to exclude Shirley, without any
concession to the evolving recognition of same-sex marriage, gives
unnecessary deference to an archaic understanding of the marital
relationship that is no longer prevalent enough to demand such a
presumption.
The redefinition of the marital relationship is not the first legal
adjustment to the American understanding of family structure and
inheritance law." Until the late nineteenth century, law and public
policy considered adopted children-much like same-sex spouses, until
very recently-artificial relatives created by "unnatural" relationships.12
Even when formal adoption was legalized in the mid-nineteenth
century, 13 courts curtailed adoption's legal and economic implications
under the so-called "stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine."l4 This doctrine,
based on social aversion, presumed that a person not directly involved
in the adoption itself (a stranger to the adoption), who did not explicitly
include an adoptee in a class gift, did not indicate intent for the adoptee
to take by using language like "child," "issue," or "descendant.""
Courts reasoned that, like a pre-Obergefell testator in a state that did
not recognize same-sex marriage, this stranger to the adoption used a
particular word to signal its traditional meaning, not its expanded legal
10. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that a testator in this situation
did not intend to include a same-sex spouse. When a bakery owner refused to bake a
cake for a same-sex couple and thought his refusal was lawful because it took place
before Obergefell, the Supreme Court characterized his thinking as "not unreasonable."
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comn'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1721
(2018).
11. For an examination of the changing face of the parent-child relationship
in light of illegitimate children gaining legal recognition, see Tritt, supra note 5, at
906.
12. See infra Part II.
13. Massachusetts enacted the first modem adoption statute in 1851. See
Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1102 (2003).
14. See infra Section m.A.
15. See infra Section U.A.
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definition.'" Under the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine, therefore, a
class gift to "descendants" excluded adopted descendants.' 7 As social
acceptance of adoption increased, however, courts that failed to
recognize adopted children as "children" under class gifts ran the risk
of defeating donors' intent. To reconcile the gap between society's
increasingly inclusionary definition of the parent-child relationship and
inheritance law's presumptively exclusionary treatment of adopted
children, three key exceptions emerged" that allowed the court to
govern the definition of "child" while preserving testamentary freedom.
Ultimately, the exceptions became superfluous when the stranger-to-
the-adoption doctrine was abolished,19 but until the parent-child
relationship was both legally and socially understood to encompass the
relationship between adoptive parents and adopted children, those
exceptions allowed courts to navigate the ambiguity inherent in
definitional change.
Similar to adoption, public policy once did not favor same-sex
marriage. However, as with adoption, there has been a shift in public
policy that has led to a shift in the law concerning same-sex marriage.
Much like the old stranger-to-adoption doctrine, to the extent that it is
not inconsistent with the explicit ex ante instructions of the testator, if a
court determined a same-sex spouse should not take under the testator's
will, the court would be treating the testator like a stranger-to-the-
marriage of the same-sex couple.
Therefore, this Article tracks the evolution of inheritance law for
adopted children and suggests that courts use construction approaches
that worked in the context of a new understanding of the parent-child
relationship as a guide to construing wills in the context of changing
social and legal definitions of the martial relationship. In this regard,
Part II offers a brief overview of pertinent construction doctrines. Next,
Part HI summarizes the history of inheritance law for adopted children.
Finally, Part IV draws an analogy between the stranger-to-the-adoption
doctrine and an approach to inheritance law for same-sex spouses that
this Essay calls the "stranger-to-the-marriage" doctrine" and posits that
16. See infra Section III.A.
17. See infra Section Hm.B.
18. See infra Section III.B.
19. Today, most states have abandoned the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine.
See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996
UTAH L. REv. 93, 154 ("The old 'stranger-to-the-adoption' rule-by which an adopted
child generally could not inherit through the adoptive parent from relatives who were
not themselves parties to the adoption-has largely, and properly, gone out of
fashion.").
20. The author has spoken about this issue on many occasions since 2012 and
coined this phrase for a series of speeches. See, e.g., Lee-ford Tritt, Professor of Law,
Univ. of Fla. Coll. of Law, Address at the 48th Annual Philip E. Heckerling Institute
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the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine provides insight by this analogy.
Finally, Part V concludes.
I. PERTINENT CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINES21
When a valid testamentary document comes before a court, the
fiduciary must manage and distribute the assets according to the terms
of the governing instrument.22 This implicates construction procedures,
the process of determining the meaning that should be attributed to the
wills and trusts. As one court noted, testamentary document
construction is governed by "two overriding rules: ... to avoid doing
any violence to the words employed in the instrument... [and] to
effectuate the testator's intent."23 Rules of construction, as well as
constructional preferences, set out the process by which the meaning of
terms and provisions in testamentary documents are to be resolved.
While rules of construction offer "particular results for particular
recurring situations,"24 constructional preferences are more general
principles upon which the specific rules are based?
Although the rules of construction address a multitude of specific
issues, each rule is premised on the overarching common goal of
on Estate Planning: Because it Wasn't Complicated Enough-Estate Planning Issues for
Same-Sex Couples in the Wake of the Supreme Court's Recent Decisions (Jan. 2014);
see also Tritt & Duffey, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1100, 1101.2.
21. For convenience, this Article discusses construction issues in terms of
wills, but these approaches apply equally to trusts.
22. American society has long recognized the value in protecting an
individual's ability to acquire and transfer property. The principle of donative freedom,
the governing principle underlying American succession law, provides that individuals
have the freedom to control the disposition of their property at death. Any succession
law disputes that arise from Obergefell should be viewed through this lens. For a
discussion concerning the importance of the principle, see Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and
Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to Parent-Child Property
Succession, 62 SMU L. REv. 367, 374-79 (2009). See also Lee-ford Tritt, Dispatches
from the Trenches of America's Great Gun Trust Wars, 108 Nw. U. L. REv. 743, 752-
54 (2014); Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of An Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust
Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 2579, 2587-88, 2598-601 (2011).
23. In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
24. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills
and Trusts, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 921, 923 (1964).
25. Rules of construction are derived from one or more constructional
preferences. For example, the rule of construction embodied in the antilapse
statutes is derived from the constructional preference for avoiding
disinheritance of a line of descent. The rule of construction that presumes
an intent to include adopted children in class gifts is derived from the
constructional preferences for the construction that carries out common
intention and for the construction that accords with public policy.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3,
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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effectuating the testator's intent above all else. In general, American
succession law embraces freedom of disposition,' which dictates that
"[t]he controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a
donative document is the donor's intention. "27 Therefore, when a
testamentary instrument is construed under these rules, the donor's
intentions are given effect to the maximum extent allowed under the
law.2 8 When applying a rule of construction, the applicable rule will be
considered together with available proof of the individual testator's
actual intent. Since the rules aim to carry out testamentary intent by
presuming what the average, similarly-situated donor would desire, any
party claiming that the donor's actual intent differs from that prescribed
by a rule of construction will bear the burden of proof.
Although effectuating intent is the primary objective of the
construction process, the adherence to testamentary intent is sometimes
difficult to achieve, hence why courts dealing with trust and estate law
are so often compelled to analyze individual facets of the constructions
in question to derive their ultimate meaning. Simply, intent is not
always clear. If donors' wishes cannot be clearly ascertained, these
rules and preferences "attribute intention to individual donors in
particular circumstances on the basis of conunon intention."29 In other
words, courts apply rules of construction in an attempt to implement the
typical testator's probable intent.' Since the rules of construction and
constructional preferences only presume intent, they can be rebutted
where proof of an alternative testamentary intention is found."
26. See, e.g., Gerald L. Greene & Michael J. Schmitt, Note, The Dilemma of
Adoptees in the Class Gift Structure-The Kentucky Approach: A Rule without Reason,
59 Ky. L.J. 921, 925 (1971) ("In attempting to determine the meaning of language in
private instruments the intent of the transferor is of primary importance.").
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
28. Id.
29. § 11.3, cmt. a.
30. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of
Disposition, 58 ST. Louis U. L.J. 643, 646 (2014).
31. Testamentary documents may, at times, present issues to which no
specific rule of construction applies. In such cases, more general constructional
preferences will be used in clarifying the ambiguity. Unlike a specific rule of
construction which applies only to a particular type of ambiguity, constructional
preferences provide broader guidelines which can be used to resolve various
ambiguities. Significant constructional preferences include the following: the preference
for construction that accords with common intention, which is a foundational preference
from which other subsidiary preferences are derived; the preference for construction
that accords with the testator's general dispositive plan; the preference for construction
that renders the document as effective as possible; the preference for construction that
favors family over non-family, favors close family members over more remote family
members, and does not disinherit a line of descent; and the preference for construction
that is more in accord with public policy than other potential constructions.
379
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Where ambiguous or mistaken language obscures the testator's
actual intent, courts have traditionally applied two interrelated rules of
construction-the plain meaning rule and the no reformation rule-but
modem courts increasingly repudiate these approaches and tend to
allow both reformation and the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
A. The Traditional Plain Meaning and No Reformation Rules
The practice of applying testamentary intent begins, as with many
areas of law, with the plain meaning of the testator's words. 32 Under
the "plain meaning" or "no-extrinsic-evidence" 33 rule, the plain
meaning of a will cannot be disturbed by the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to prove that another meaning was intended.34 In essence, the
plain meaning of a testator's expressions usually controls, and courts
are sometimes reluctant to look outside of a testamentary instrument to
divine actual intent-put simply, a testator's words are exactly that."
However, this doctrine involves some subjectivity-what is "plain" to
one judge may not be plain to another-and the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence hinges on a particular judge's understanding of a
term's "plain meaning." Under the closely related no reformation rule,
courts may not reform a will to reflect what the testator intended to, but
did not say; a court must in interpret the words the testator actually
used and cannot provide its own words to correct the testator's
mistakes.36
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERs § 11.3
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).
32. In re Clark, 417 S.E.2d 856, 857 (S.C. 1992) ("A will must be read in
the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words employed, unless some obvious
absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency with the declared intention of the testator, as
abstracted from the whole will, should follow from such construction.").
33. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on
the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
521, 521 (1982). The plain meaning rule is sometimes called the no-extrinsic-evidence
rule since it "prescribes that courts not receive evidence about the testator's intent
'apart from, in addition to, or in opposition to the legal effect of the language which is
used by him in the will itself.'" Id. (quoting WILUAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER,
PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS, § 32.9, at 332-33 (1960)).
34. See id.; Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 651.
35. In re Stephens' Will, 238 N.W. 900, 903 (Wis. 1931) (Fairchild, J.,
dissenting) ("[N]o rule of construction is more effective to discover the testator's
intention than that which requires that words shall be given their plain and ordinary
meaning. The words used by the testator in this instance are final and
comprehensive."); see also May v. Riley, 305 S.E.2d 77, 78 (S.C. 1983).
36. Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 651; Sanderson v. Norcross, 136 N.E. 170,
172 (Mass. 1922) ("Courts have no power to reform wills. . . . [M]istakes of testators
cannot be corrected. Omissions cannot be supplied. Language cannot be modified to
meet unforeseen changes in conditions. The only means for ascertaining the intent of
the testator are the words written and the acts done by him.").
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B. Exceptions to the Bar on Extrinsic Evidence: Ambiguities
Traditionally, extrinsic evidence was admissible only if the
evidence went to the validity of the will or if the will itself was
ambiguous.3 An ambiguity implies at least two meaning of one word or
phrase. Courts further limited the availability of extrinsic evidence by
distinguishing between patent and latent ambiguities: courts admitted
extrinsic evidence to help construe latent ambiguities (which exist when
the terms in the will are applied to the facts) but not to help construe
patent ambiguities (which are evident on the face of the will).38 Patent
ambiguities, arising as they do from within the document, are generally
resolved through examining the language of the document itself, as
used to be, and in some ways still is, the guiding philosophy of trust
and estates issues to this day.39 For example, a testator's bequest giving
"a quarter of my estate to each of these three people" is patently
ambiguous-it is clearly unclear. Because the bequest is ambiguous on
its face, no extrinsic evidence is permissible and the bequest fails. With
patent ambiguities, courts rarely permit the inclusion of extrinsic
evidence' and often resolve to give words "their generally accepted
literal and grammatical meaning," a reversion to plain meaning.41
Latent ambiguities, by contrast, may arise when the terms used in the
will insufficiently clarify what the testator was intending to.42 Latent
ambiguities are characterized by the fact that the ambiguity only arises
when other sources besides the testamentary document are before the
court.43 For example, a testator's bequest giving "my entire estate to
my cousin Benny" does not initially appear ambiguous. However, if the
testator has two cousins, both named Benny, there is a latent ambiguity.
While extrinsic evidence may be "generally inadmissible to add to,
vary, or contradict language used in a will," it may be admitted by
courts in order to "explain a latent ambiguity."" Importantly, extrinsic
evidence may also be used to raise the issue of latent ambiguity, not
37. Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 651.
38. Breckner v. Prestwood, 600 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
39. See, e.g., Lord Cheyney's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 158, 158 (1591) ("[Tlhe
constructions of wills ought to be collected from the . . . words of the will in writing,
and not by any averment out of it.").
40. In re Estate of Matthews, 702 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005)
(patent ambiguities are "resolved from within the four corners of the will and without
consideration of extrinsic evidence").
41. In re Estate of Tiedeman, 912 N.W.2d 816, 827 (Neb. Ct. App. 2018).
42. Weatherhead v. Sewell, 28 Tenn. 272, 295 (1848).
43. Higgins v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 62 So. 774 (Ala. 1913).
44. Stickley v. Carnichael, 850 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tenn. 1992).
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just resolve the ambiguity once the court recognizes its existence.45
Latent ambiguities typically take one of three forms: (1) equivocation,
where two or more persons or things fit the description exactly (like
cousin Benny), (2) personal usage, where the testator habitually used a
term in an idiosyncratic manner, or (3) misdescription, where a
description in the will does not exactly fit any person or thing.'
C. Modem Construction Trends
The modem trend repudiates distinguishing between patent and
latent ambiguities, the plain meaning rule, and the no reformation
rule.47 As early as 1898, some scholars criticized the distinction
between patent ambiguities, for which extrinsic evidence was not
admissible, and latent ambiguities, for which it was, as "an unprofitable
subtlety. "' Today, the distinction carries little weight and is often
ignored or expressly rejected.49 Distinguishing between types of
ambiguities that allow or preclude the introduction of extrinsic evidence
is perhaps a moot point under modem estates law, because the modem
trend generally rejects the no reformation rule, rendering ambiguity
superfluous where mistake exists. The no reformation rule establishes a
conclusive presumption of correctness for the words used in a duly
executed will and thus protects against the finding of a contrived
"mistake."o However, the rule also denies relief when there is an
actual mistake, even where there is evidence of mistake and the
testator's actual intent.5 ' More forgiving courts began to correct wills
under the pretense of allowing extrinsic evidence to construe
supposedly ambiguous terms, which has been characterized as
"expressly disclaim[ing] "52 the plain meaning rule53 and as well as
45. In re Estate of Bernstrauch, 313 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Neb. 1981)
("[E]xtrinsic evidence is admissible both to disclose and to remove the latent ambiguity
of the will.").
46. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
333-34 (10th ed. 2017).
47. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in
American Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CALIF. L. REV.1877, 1885-86 (2000).
48. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, 530 n.28 (quoting J.B.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 424 (1898)).
49. See Halbach, supra note 47, at 1885.
50. Sitkoff, supra note 30, at 651.
51. Id.
52. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, at 521.
53. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Arnheiter, 125 A.2d 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1956) (construing "No. 304 Harrison Avenue" to mean "No. 317 Harrison
Avenue"); Estate of Gibbs v. Krause, 111 N.W. 2d 413 (Wis. 1961) (construing
"Robert J. Krause" to mean "Robert W. Krause"); In re Estate of Taff, 133 Cal. Rptr.
737 (1976); Engle v. Siegel, 377 A.2d 892 (N.J. 1977).
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moving away from the no-reformation rule. Today, the Uniform
Probate Code, the Restatement Third of Property, and several courts
allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to both clarify and reform
the terms of a will.5
II. HISTORY OF INHERITANCE LAW FOR ADOPTED CHILDREN
Initially, common law succession was based solely on blood
relationships." The idea that anyone outside bloodlines would inherit
family property was thus fairly foreign until the mid-nineteenth
century." Neither was it common to formally add members to the
family-and thus add potential donees-other than through the
traditional means of marriage and subsequent children." When
"adding" children through adoption became a legal possibility,
inheritance laws still favored blood relationships-initial statutes that
gave legitimacy to the formal idea of adoption "disfavored adoptees and
barred them from inheriting from third-party donors" under the
stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine." Based on the theory "that the
personal relationship created between the adoptive parents and the child
[did] not automatically create the same legal status between the child
and the relatives of the adoptive parents,"5 9 the stranger-to-the-adoption
doctrine created the presumption that an adoptee was not within a class
gift made by a donor other than the adoptor. 0 However, even at the
peak of the doctrine's popularity, the presumption against the adoptee
could be overcome by evidence of the donor's intent to include the
adoptee.'
A. Stranger-to-the-Adoption Doctrine
To fully understand the evolution of the stranger-to-the-adoption
doctrine, it is necessary to address changes in the general perception of
54. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERs § 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
55. See Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally
Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REv. 367, 374-79
(2009).
56. Jackie Messler, The Inconsistent Inheritance Rights of Adult Adoptees and
a Proposal for Uniformity, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 1043, 1046 (2012).
57. See Greene & Schmitt, supra note 26, at 921.
58. Messler, supra note 56, at 1046.
59. Greene & Schmitt, supra note 26, at 922.
60. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Issues about Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift
Problems, 48 Mo. L. REv. 333, 337 (1983).
61. Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who
Should Get What and Why (the Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable
Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 733 (1984).
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adoption which have occurred over time. Massachusetts enacted the
first modem adoption statute in 1851.62 This statute called for the
adoptee to be treated as the child of his adoptive parents, except that he
would "not be capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs
of the body or bodies of the parents by adoption, nor property from the
lineal or collateral kindred of such parents by right of representation."63
Legislators, clearly unsure of how to handle the legal ramifications of
adoption, created a version of the parent-child relationship that ceased
to exist in the context of inheritance. An unfamiliar concept, adoption
was met with significant hesitation by legislators as well as by society.
For example, as early as 1873, New York legislation included
provisions on the inheritance rights of adopted children, but attitudes
toward adoption remained uncertain and those provisions were
ultimately removed.' Unanswered questions-and the attendant social
suspicion-surrounding the adoptive process led to significant
inconsistency within early statutes concerning adoption. These statutes
often did not address the issue of adoption completely; early legislation
focused on the adoption procedures rather than on the legal status of
adoptees, leaving courts to determine whether an adoption created a
true parent-child relationship." This history of inconsistent and
incomplete adoption legislation reflects the general distrust, uncertainty,
and hesitation that characterized attitudes toward adoption at the time;
societal aversion to recognizing "artificial" children perhaps explains
the traditional lack of legal inheritance rights for adoptees.
Even when courts determined that a parent-child relationship did
exist between an adopted child and her adoptive parents, they generally
rejected the presumption of any relationship between the adopted child
and her adoptive parents' relatives.' Although highly inconsistent with
today's trend of complete transplantation, the stranger-to-the-adoption-
doctrine-which precluded adoptees from taking under class gifts made
by third-party donors, who were "strangers" to the adoption-was
standard when these early adoption statutes were being enacted. The
doctrine was not questioned by courts. Rather, it received significant
support from judicial bodies, which viewed the relatively new process
of adoption as something foreign and unnatural. For example, in the
1881 decision of Keegan v. Geraghty," the Supreme Court of Illinois
recognized that "[t]he proceeding of adoption is one entirely between .
62. Cahn, supra note 13, at 1102.
63. Id. at 1113.
64. Id. at 1101-02.
65. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class
Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REv. 971 (1965).
66. See Greene & Schmitt, supra note 26, at 922.
67. 101 Ill. 25 (1881).
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. . parents and the child, at the instance, by the consent, and upon the
petition of the . . . parents."68 The court noted that "the artificial
relation from adoption is established between these parties" was not
meant to extend to those who were not a party to the adoption
process." According to the court, it would be reasonable for an
adoptive parent's property to go to an adopted child. 70 However, the
court questioned whether someone who was not a party to the adoption,
"who has never desired or requested to have such artificial relation
established as to himself," should have his property distributed "to such
an unnatural course of descent." 7 ' Given no express language that
would offer an adopted child the right to inherit from a party not
involved in the adoption proceeding, the court in Keegan found no
reason for property to pass from those related to the adoptive parents
and "into the hands of an alien in blood."72 The court thus stood behind
the stranger-to-the-adoption rule .7 Early cases such as Keegan held
blood relationships in the highest regard and therefore held that third
parties not involved in the adoptive process who made bequests to
'children' or 'issue' would not have intended for an adopted child to
take.
Moving into the early twentieth century, courts emphasized the
contractual nature of adoption proceedings and generally continued to
exclude adoptees. For example, the court in Merritt v. Morton7 4
acknowledged that an adopted child would be considered an heir-at-law
of the adoptive parents but concluded that adoption was contractual: it
only bound the parties to the adoption contract. 75 The Merritt family
contracted with the Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home to adopt a child,
and the family raised the child as their own. Carrie Merritt, the
adoptive mother, died shortly before 1910-the year in which her own
mother, Sarah Morton, died. In deciding whether the adoptee could
take a portion of Morton's intestate estate through his adoptive mother,
the court ruled that "while [the adoptive parents] have a perfect right to
bind or obligate themselves to make the child their heir, they are
powerless to extend this right on [the child's] part to inherit from
others. "78 The Kentucky court noted that "inheritance laws are based .
68. Id. at 35.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 136 S.W. 133 (Ky. 1911).
75. Greene & Schmitt, supra note 26, 933.
76. Merritt, 136 S.W. at 133.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 134.
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. upon natural ties of blood relationship, whereas an adopted child's
right to inherit rests upon a contract."7 Therefore the court concluded
that only the parties to the adoption contract were bound by the
adoption and found that the adoptee could not take any portion of
Morton's intestate estate."
B. Exceptions
Over time, adoption became less of a social anomaly," and judicial
support for more inclusionary policies surfaced in the middle of the
twentieth century. In an attempt to reflect increasing social acceptance
of adoption, several courts created exceptions to the stranger-to-the-
adoption doctrine under which adopted children might be treated as
"natural" children in certain circumstances. Three such exceptions
surfaced: (1) where adoption occurred before the testator's death; (2)
where a document included differentiation of terms; and (3) in the case
of an infertile parent.
1. ADOPTION OCCURRED BEFORE THE TESTATOR'S DEATH
In cases where the child in question was adopted before the testator
executed his will, courts generally recognized an exception to the
stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine.82 The exact terms of this exception
varied between states, and in certain states the terms were inherently
unclear.13 Where the testator was a stranger to the adoption, some
courts inferred an intention to include the adoptee "from mere
knowledge of the adoption, absent some evidence of the transferor's
intention to exclude."" For example, in the 1950 case of Mesecher v.
Leir,15 the Supreme Court of Iowa was faced with the issue of whether
the adopted child of the testator's aunt would receive an equal share of
the gift to the aunt's children, along with the aunt's two natural
children.86 The court noted that the testator in question "had known of
the adoption" and had associated with both the adoptee and the adoptor
79. Id.
80. Id. at 133-34.
81. By the early twentieth century, "formal adoption ha[d] evolved from a
relative rarity to become a truly popular means of ushering newcomers into a family."
Rein, supra note 61, at 734.
82. Halbach, supra note 65, at 982.
83. Id. at 982.
84. Id. at 983.
85. 43 N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 1950).
86. Id. at 150.
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for thirty-seven years." Because of this, the court ruled that the adopted
child was entitled to an equal share.'
Other courts, however, chose to require explicit signs of approval
of the adoption before allowing an adoptee to take under a class gift. In
In re Dudley's Will,89 the court established that an adopted child could
be included in a class gift if there was evidence that the testator so
intended." In Dudley, the testator was himself a practicing lawyer in
New York City." He created his own holographic will, which called
for the residuary gift to be "erected into a trust for the life benefit of
testator's sister . .. and upon her death to pay over the principal sum to
my nieces . . . and my nephews" with "the descendants of any
deceased niece or nephew taking by representation."' One of these
nieces never had any biological children, but she had adopted two
children before the testator executed his holographic will. 93 The testator
knew about these adopted children at the time he created the
testamentary instrument and he was "not on unfriendly terms" with
them.? The Dudley court found that this fell "far short of the
demonstration which would be required to establish an affirmative
desire to include [the adopted children].""
Questions also arose when the adoption occurred after a will's
execution but prior to the testator's death. Some courts found it
sufficient that the "facts essential to the exception, whatever they may
be in the particular state" were in place when the testator died, even if
they were not in place at the time of will execution." However, other
courts disagreed.97 These courts reasoned that when construing a will, it
is the testator's intent at the time the will is executed controls.98 This
would render any occurrences after will execution irrelevant, "except
insofar as a reaction, or failure to react, can be deemed a reflection of
[the testator's] earlier state of mind."" Realistically, where courts
included children adopted between will execution and the testator's
death in class gifts, they revealed judicial resistance to the stranger-to-
87. Id. at 154.
88. Id.
89. 6 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
90. Id. at 492-93.
91. Id. at 490.
92. Id. at 490-91.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 491-92.
95. Id. at 492.
96. Halbach, supra note 65, at 983.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 984.
99. Id.
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the-adoption rule and a tendency to favor inclusion over a presumption
that could easily run counter to the testator's intent.100
2. DIFFERENTIATION OF TERMS
Courts also applied an exception to the stranger-to-the-adoption
rule by differentiating between a gift to "A's children" and a gift to
"A's descendants" or "the heirs of A's body."o'0 A gift to "A's
children" automatically included A's adoptive child, whether or not the
child was adopted before the testator's death." On the other hand,
courts interpreted "A's descendants" or "the heirs of A's body" as
referring to the natural lineal descendants, a biological connotation;
therefore, A's adoptive children were excluded.103 By using the newly-
developed social understanding of "child" in a way that expanded the
traditional legal meaning of the term, courts formalized a social trend in
favor of normalizing adoption and demonstrated growing reluctance to
apply the traditional presumption against including adopted children in
class gifts.
3. AN INFERTILE PARENT
Courts applied a third exception less often: when the parent of the
adopted child was infertile." In these situations, "the facts [were] said
to support an inference that the transferor must have had the possibility
of adopted children in mind."105 This explanation seems especially odd
when one considers lawyer-created wills-if a client truly had the
possibility of adopted children in mind, the lawyer should have
explicitly provided for that possibility in the will-and some courts
refused to recognize the infertile parent exception." It has been noted
that courts may have applied this exception simply because they were
unwilling to apply the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine," much like
the courts that allowed an adoptee to take even when the adoption took
place after the will execution.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Holter v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 336 P.2d 701, 702-03
(Mont. 1959); Poertner v. Burkdoll, 439 P.2d 393 (Kan. 1938)
102. Victoria Mikesell Mather, The Magic Circle: Inclusion of Adopted
Children in Testamentary Class Gifts, 31 S. TEx. L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1990); Rein,
supra note 61, at 734.
103. Mather, supra note 102, at 226-28; Rein, supra note 61, at 734.
104. Halbach, supra note 65, at 984.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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C. The Current State of Inheritance Law for Adopted Children
Today, the main focus of modem adoption cases "is to achieve
complete severance of the child from his biological family and a total
transplantation of the child into his adoptive family. "18 Current policy
tends to "promote the well-being of the adoptee by making him a full-
fledged member of his new family."" As a result, most states have
replaced the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine with the presumption that
the donor intends to include adoptees in a class gift unless the
instrument expressly states that adopted children are excluded from the
gift.o Some states have enacted legislation to this effect."' Other states
left the resolution of this issue up to the courts, which created a body of
case law rejecting the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine.H"2 In the
majority of states, an adopted child will take under a class gift 'created
by someone other than the adoptive parent if the adoption took place
while the child was a minor, if the adoptive parent "was the child's
stepparent or foster parent" or "functioned as a parent of the child
before the child reached the age of majority.""' Additionally, forty-
four states have adopted statutes allowing the adoptee to inherit under
the laws of intestacy.114
There is significant inconsistency among courts concerning
whether the abolition of the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine should
apply retroactively. The issue of retroactivity is especially pronounced
when a court must interpret a will several years after it was executed."'
108. Rein, supra note 61, at 720.
109. Id. at 722.
110. Brashier, supra note 19, at 154; Mather, supra note 102, at 227; Rein,
supra note 61, at 734.
111. Mather, supra note 102, at 227; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
45a-731 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.195 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16
(2014); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.017(c) (West 2013).
112. Mather, supra note 102, at 227; see, e.g., Elliott v. Hiddelson, 303
N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 1981); In re Tafel's Estate, 296 A.2d 797, 802-03 (Pa. 1973);
In re Estate of Coe, 201 A.2d 571, 574-76 (N.J. 1964).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 14.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
114. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. INTESTATE CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, INHERITANCE RIGHTS FOR
ADOPTED PERSONS 2 n.3 (2016),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/inheritance.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF2V-
Z9DA].
115. Messler, supra note 56, at 1050.
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Some courts elect to apply the law that was in place at the time of the
testator's death, assuming that when the testator created the
testamentary document, he had current law and current social
conventions in mind."' In a 1971 case,11" the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, construing a will executed in 1929, declined
to retroactively apply the statute that abolished the stranger-to-the-
adoption doctrine."' As justification for its decision against retroactive
application, the court pointed to the assumption that an average testator
of the time would not have wished for a non-blood individual to take
under his will.11 9
Such an assumption against inclusion, however, has been
questioned. In the 1977 case of Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v.
Hanes,12 0 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted:
While there may be testators and trustors who are so
concerned with medieval concepts of 'bloodline' and 'heirs of
the body' that they would be truly upset at the thought that
their hard-won assets would one day pass into the hands of
persons not of their blood, we cannot formulate general rules
of law for the benefit of such eccentrics. 2 1
In line with this theory, other states allow retroactive application
so that adoptees are able to inherit from third-party donors even if the
donor created the testamentary instrument when the stranger-to-the-
adoption doctrine was in effect. 122 The state of Indiana, for example,
abolished the stranger-to-the-adoption-doctrine in 2003 and specifically
allowed for retroactive application of the new provision. 23
III. FROM STRANGER-TO-THE-ADOPTION TO STRANGER-TO-THE-
MARRIAGE
The stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine provides insight by analogy
into how courts should construe a will that was executed before
116. Id.
117. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Sununerlin, 445 F.2d 201, 204
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
118. Messler, supra note 56, at 1050.
119. Id. (quoting Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and
Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Inpact of Adoptions, Adult
Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND.
L. REv. 711, 738 (1984)).
120. 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977).
121. Id. at 503.
122. See Messler, supra note 56, at 1050.
123. Id.
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Obergefell, absent any explicit ex ante instructions from the testator.
Under the stranger-to-the-adoption regime, courts presumed that
someone not directly involved in an adoption would not see himself as
related to the adoptee, at least for inheritance purposes. Because
adoption was not yet widely socially accepted, courts presumed that a
stranger to the adoption would not consider such an "artificial relation"
to be an actual "child" or "issue."124 Rather, a third-party donor's
intent to include an adopted child in a class gift generally had to be
explicit enough that the social presumption against leaving property to
an "artificial relation" was clearly overcome." Thus, under this
doctrine, courts could bar an adopted child from taking under a will
that stated the gift was "to A and A's children." Before Obergefell,
when some states still banned same-sex marriage, probate courts could
ostensibly bar a same-sex spouse from taking under a will that stated
the gift was "to A and A's spouse." Based on reasoning similar to that
applied under the stranger-to-the-adoption regime, such courts could
determine that where the general definition of "spouse" did not include
same-sex spouses-in states that did not recognize same-sex marriage-
a testator would not intend to include a same-sex spouse by using the
term "spouse." These courts would effectively deem the testator a
stranger to the (same-sex) marriage.
Post-Obergefell, it is difficult to imagine a court would rule in this
way, at least if the will was executed after Obergefell.126 But what if the
will had been executed before Obergefell in a state where same-sex
marriage was illegal at the time of will execution?'27 Such a scenario
implicates a retroactivity issue similar to the one triggered by the
stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine's abolition. A court could choose to
construe the will according to the law at the time the will was executed,
which would bar a same-sex spouse from taking under a gift "to A and
A's spouse"; such a court could presume that someone living in a state
in which same-sex marriage was illegal would have relied on that law
124. Halbach, supra note 60, at 337; Messler, supra note 56, at 1046.
125. See Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 I. 26, 35 (1881).
126. There would be no constitutional issues if a court did rule in this way,
however, because probate is not considered state action. See George B. Fraser, Jr.,
Action in Rem, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 29, 36 (1948) (stating that probate proceedings are
actions in rem).
127. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, a bakery
owner refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018). The Supreme Court stated that the bakery owner was not unreasonable in
believing his actions were lawful because this occurred before Obergefell. Id. at 1742.
There was a law in Colorado that did not allow business owners to discriminate based
on sexual orientation, however. Id. at 1725. Even so, the Court was lenient towards the
bakery owner because Obergefell had not yet been decided when he refused to bake the
cake. In a situation in which a testator drafted a will before Obergefell, courts may be
similarly lenient, especially because no anti-discrimination laws would be implicated.
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when drafting the will. As some courts reasoned in the adoption
context, the older the will, the more likely it is that the average testator
at the time intended to reference the older meaning of a term; a much
older will makes it more likely that the testator contemplated "spouse"
only in terms of an opposite-sex spouse.1 28 However, a court could find
itself unable to "formulate general rules of law for the benefit of . . .
eccentrics"129 who do not consider "spouse" to encompass spouses of
the same sex, and could instead apply the more inclusive redefinition of
the term as the new normal. Like the court in Wheeling Dollar Savings
& Trust Co. v. Hanes, a court could discount the concerns of testators
who would be upset by their property going to a same-sex spouse as the
concerns of adherents to an archaic, and implicitly irrelevant, way of
thinking.
A. Stranger-to-the-Marriage Exceptions
To avoid a presumption that a testator who executed a will pre-
Obergefell intended to exclude a same-sex spouse, a court could apply
exceptions similar to the stranger-to-the-adoption exceptions. In the
context of same-sex marriage, a court could apply an exception if the
marriage occurred before the testator's death.130 If the marriage
occurred before the execution of the will, the court could presume that
the testator intended to include the spouse. If a court required evidence
that the testator approved of the marriage, as some courts did under the
adoption exception, the court could look to extrinsic evidence of
approval, such as wedding photographs that include the testator.
If the marriage occurred before death but after the will was
executed, courts could be split, as they were under the adoption
exception. Some courts may determine that the testator's intent at the
time the will was executed controls, in which case the fact that the
same-sex couple got married before the testator died would be
irrelevant because the marriage occurred after the will was executed.
Those courts may even consider the testator's failure to change the will
to specifically include the same-sex spouse to be evidence of the
testator's intent to exclude the same-sex spouse. Those courts would
consider the "failure to react" to be "a reflection of [the testator's]
earlier state of mind.""' However, other courts may find it enough that
128. See, e.g., Riggs Nat'1 Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d
201, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (reasoning that a drafter of a will must have drafted the will
with the laws at the time of drafting in mind).
129. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 503 (W.
Va. 1977).
130. Under the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine, there was an exception for
when the adoption occurred before the testator's death. Halbach, supra note 65, at 983.
131. Id. at 984.
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the "facts essential to the exception," 32 in this case the marriage of the
same-sex couple, existed when the testator died, whether or not they
existed at the time the will was executed.
Additionally, a court could apply exceptions similar to the
differentiation of terms and the infertile parent exceptions to the
stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine. For example, under the
differentiation of terms exception, "to A and A's partner" could be
treated differently than "to A and A's spouse," or to "A and A's
husband" (but female A is actually married to another female). The
infertile parent exception can be analogized to a LGBT person's
unwillingness to marry someone of the opposite-sex. In the infertile
parent context, "[t]he facts are said to support an inference that the
transferor must have had the possibility of adopted children in mind."'33
Similarly, if a testator knew the relative was LGBT, the testator must
have had the possibility of a same-sex marriage in mind.
B. Stranger-to-the-Marriage Applied to a Non-Class Gift
The development of the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine can also
provide direction to states for how to deal with a gift that uses narrower
language, such a "to A and A's wife," when A is married to a man.
While a gift "to A and A's wife" does not fit neatly into the stranger-
to-the-adoption framework since it is not a broad class gift, such as
'children' or 'issue,' the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine still provides
insight by analogy. Like it did with adoption, the law and public policy
has shifted and now accepts same-sex marriage. When adoption became
widely accepted, the law in the majority of states changed to include
adopted children in class gifts." Because same-sex marriage is now
accepted in every state, 35 states should adopt laws allowing courts to
presume 'wife' means 'husband' or 'husband' means 'wife' if there is a
gift to a same-sex spouse who would otherwise be precluded from
taking under the will. Like the modem presumptions in the adoption
context, this presumption for same-sex marriage could be rebutted by
evidence of the testator's contrary intent.
Alternatively, some states could view the legalization of same-sex
marriage more like the legalization of adoption in 1851. Soon after
adoption was legalized, courts created the stranger-to-the-adoption
132. Id. at 983.
133. Id. at 984.
134. Mather, supra note 102, at 227; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
45a-731 (2017); OR. REv. STAT. § 112.195 (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16 (2014);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.017(c) (West 2013).
135. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (holding that
state laws "excluding[ing] same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex couples" were unconstitutional).
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doctrine. Even though adoption was legal, it was still met with
hesitation. Today, we still have legal battles over wedding cakes for
same-sex couples.' 36 This is just one example of the resistance to same-
sex marriage, despite the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell.
Unlike adoption, same-sex marriage is still not universally accepted by
American citizens, even though all states are required to accept it.
States in which same-sex marriage was illegal until Obergefell forced
them to legalize it'3 7 may view probate as one of the few areas in which
they can still resist acceptance of same-sex marriage. These states may
be unlikely to adopt legislation that would interpret 'husband' or 'wife'
differently because a same-sex spouse would otherwise be barred from
taking under the will.
Several of the last states to legalize same-sex marriage were also
slow in abolishing the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine. California was
the first state to abolish the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine in 1957. "3
North Dakota did not adopt its statute abolishing the stranger-to-the-
adoption doctrine until 1993.'3 South Dakota was even slower,
adopting its statute abolishing the doctrine in 1995.'40 Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee abolished the doctrine
sooner than North Dakota and South Dakota, but still over a decade
after California. 41 This further supports the theory that these states may
136. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
137. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Texas. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW REs. CTR. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/
[https://perma.cc/292G-78HR].
138. In re Heard's Estate, 319 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Cal. 1957); Halbach, supra
note 65, at 993. California legalized same-sex marriage in 2013. Same-Sex Marriage,
State by State, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/. While this is
much later than the first state to legalize same-sex marriage in 2003, id., California was
not forced by the Supreme Court into legalizing same-sex marriage like the states listed
supra note 137. One can only speculate how many years it would have taken those
states to legalize same-sex marriage if not for Obergefell. One state that did not legalize
same-sex marriage until Obergefell did not delay in abolishing the stranger-to-the-
adoption doctrine. Michigan abolished the doctrine in 1966. See Wallin v. Torson, 279
N.W.2d 310, 312 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), making it one of the earliest states to abolish
the doctrine. See Halbach, supra note 65, 993 (discussing only two states that had
abolished the doctrine by 1965).
139. 1993 N.D. Laws 1179.
140. 1995 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 167 § 2-705.
141. Gotlieb v. Klotzman, 369 So. 2d 798, 801 (Ala. 1979) ("[Aldopted
children are treated the same as natural children, unless a desire to exclude them is
clearly indicated by the testator."); Warner v. First Nat'1 Bank of Atlanta, 251 S.E.2d
511, 513 (Ga. 1978) ("[An adopted child is to be treated in all respects the same as a
natural born child and would be entitled to take by bequest under the will of an ancestor
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be reluctant to change legislation to allow 'husband' or 'wife' to be
interpreted differently to prevent a same-sex spouse from being
excluded. If they do, they may be slow to change, like they were with
the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine. However, the trajectory of
adoption as a social construct-where changing family structure
influenced the definition of children in society and in law-suggests that
states will ultimately reach a greater degree of uniformity in their
approaches to handling the ramifications of same-sex marriage.
CONCLUSION
In periods of transition, prevailing cultural norms highlight the
dual nature of normative constructs. These constructs embody both
descriptive and prescriptive elements which are usually inextricably
intertwined. In social stasis, the general understanding of how things
are and the understanding of how things should be exist in approximate
symmetry. When a descriptive norm shifts, however, and the
understanding of what is familiar evolves, the prescriptive norm also
shifts-the understanding of how things should be also changes. In a
very basic sense, the law offers one manifestation of society's
prescriptive norms. Thus, as the understanding of family structure and
critical familiar relationships expands to encompass new notions of
family-of children, of spouses-the law must adjust to accommodate
this descriptive definition. The law changes both to affirm the evolving
understanding-that, for example, an adopted child is a child or that a
same-sex marriage is a marriage-and to prescribe legal treatment of
social constructs according to this new understanding, to offer a new
approach to how things should be. It is in this period of transition,
between the acceptance and legal recognition of a "new normal" and
as-yet unaddressed ramifications of change, that ambiguity arises.
A practical approach to implementing a new approach to marriage
is necessary, particularly in estates law, where recognition of the
marital relationship can govern dispositions for both testacy and
intestacy purposes.
Just as the parent-child relationship is no longer defined solely
according to the presence or presumption of a genetic link between two
individuals, the marital relationship is no longer limited to marriage
between one man and one woman. These developments, viewed
analogously, can provide insight into emerging construction issues as
by adoption."); Dodds v. Deposit Guar. Nat'1 Bank, 371 So. 2d 878, 880-81 (Miss.
1979) (construing a Mississippi statute to include adopted children in a class gift); 1976
Tenn. Pub. Acts 948-49 (enacting legislation that included adopted children in class
gifts); 1974 Fla. Laws 228 (enacting legislation that included adopted children in class
gifts).
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states struggle to reconcile Obergefell with terms used in older
instruments. Where the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine reflected
social aversion to an unfamiliar, "unnatural" parent-child relationship,
the presumptive exclusion of same-sex spouses for inheritance purposes
reflects social suspicion of a once-foreign form of a marital
relationship-it embodies a stranger-to-the-marriage approach.
Paralleling the path of the presumption against adoptees, the
presumption against same-sex spouses no longer reflects either
prevailing social attitudes or the current state of the law. The construct
of marriage has shifted in both a descriptive and prescriptive normative
sense-same-sex spouses are more familiar, usual embodiments of the
martial relationship, and since Obergefell, the law prescribes treating
them as such. Now, perhaps, it is up to courts to weave the descriptive
and prescriptive elements of the martial relationship back together in a
new pattern-to create symmetry connotation and denotation and
between what is and what should be. If an adopted child can be a child,
so too can a same-sex spouse be a spouse.
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